The
revolution and the counterrevolution
June 27, 2013
June 30
may be remembered as another turning point for the Egyptian Revolution.
Opponents of President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood will take to the
streets on the one-year anniversary of Morsi's first day in office to call on
him to resign.
The June
30 mobilizations are the culmination of the "Tamarod" (Rebellion)
petition campaign. Organizers say they have gathered more than 15 million
signatures in support of a call for Morsi to resign--more than the number of
votes Morsi received in the presidential election last year. Both sides expect
that the June 30 demonstrations will be as big as any since the 2011 revolution
that overthrew dictator Hosni Mubarak. Many activists fear that Morsi and the
Brotherhood will try to provoke violence.
Sameh
Naguib, a leading member of the
Revolutionary Socialists in Egypt, wrote this article analyzing the political
situation in Egypt in the wake of the Tamarod campaign, as the lead
contribution for Socialist Notes, the re-launched political journal
of the RS.
Protesters rally against Morsi's IMF deals and the detention of
political prisoners (Gigi Ibrahim)
The Crisis of Brotherhood Rule
The Muslim Brotherhood came to power in a historical
circumstance whose meaning it did not understand. For the Brotherhood imagined
that the democracy of the ballot box was the goal for which the revolution had
been undertaken. They did not understand the fundamental social and democratic
content of this huge historical revolution.
Their compass was not oriented toward the revolutionary
masses, but toward those with vested interests: Egypt's businessmen, the U.S.
administration, the Gulf monarchies. They had been able to convince these
groups that they were able to protect the same interests served by Mubarak's
regime, while simultaneously satisfying the Egyptian people with a combination
of false promises and empty religious slogans.
Consequently, they sought to empty the revolution of its
content to guarantee the interests of those terrified by the revolution. But
they quickly discovered that people who had revolted by the millions, removing
the man at the pinnacle of power, would not accept this cooptation. Their false
promises did nothing but increase popular anger and awareness of the Brotherhood's
opportunism and hostility toward the revolution.
Two choices had laid before the Brotherhood, both of them
bitter. The first was to arrive at some deal with the remnants of the old
regime and the quasi-oppositionists among the liberals. The other was a close
alliance with the Salafi groups, including those with residual roots in the
Said [Upper Egypt] and among the slums of the cities.
From the beginning, the Brotherhood had already made big
strides toward the first option, with unparalleled concessions to the military
and security institutions, which were the heart of the former regime. But these
institutions accepted the bargains on the basis of a faulty assessment of the
Brotherhood's capability to coopt the people and drain revolutionary anger by manipulating
the elections.
However, when they discovered the Brotherhood's
incompetence, the rapid transformation of the national consciousness against
the Brotherhood, the rapid collapse of the economy through a series of
calamitous errors by the Brotherhood leadership, they began to rethink their
bargain. This became apparent in the oscillations, contradictions and tension
in the statements of the army leadership.
Thus, the alliance of the old regime remnants with the
liberal organizations opposing the Brotherhood. The state of siege that the
Brotherhood faces on a daily basis, has led to efforts at rapprochement with
the Salafi groups and the use of escalating sectarian language, whether towards
the Copts or the Shia, or in declaring all those who oppose them kafirs
[apostates to Islam].
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The Economic Crisis
The Economic Crisis
Since the rise of Mohamed Morsi and the Brotherhood to
power, they have implemented the same economic program as Gamal Mubarak and the
policy committee prior to the revolution. It is a neoliberal program centered
around market liberalization and an increasing assimilation into the global
capitalist economy. These are the same policies that played a pivotal role in
igniting the Egyptian revolution.
For these policies are not only violent attacks on the
interests and the standard of living of the poor, to the advantage of the
Muslim Brotherhood, feloul billionaires and military leaders. They represent
the same demands from global financial institutions and the Gulf monarchies
that Egypt accept implementation of policies further impoverishing the poor and
enriching the wealthy.
It appears that Morsi, Shatir and the Brotherhood are
oblivious to three facts that no rational person could fail to notice.
The first is that the revolution in the country has arisen
from the hopes and expectations of millions of poor, workers and farmers for
true social justice, to redistribute the wealth from big business to the
people, and not the reverse.
The second fact is that the capitalist world has been
suffering from the violence of its crises since the 1930s because of the same
brutal capitalist policies, which are the idol that the Brotherhood leadership
serves as if it were a Koranic text.
The third fact is that global capitalism, whether from the
Gulf or from the West, will not invest in a morass like the Egyptian economy.
It will not venture into a country whose very existence is still being shaken
by the revolution, a revolution that is rocking the entire world, as we have
seen recently in Turkey and Greece.
Global capitalism, under the leadership of American
imperialism and its allies in the Gulf states, wants its revenge on the
Egyptian people because of their great revolution, which has inspired and
continues to inspire the poor of the world. It is this revolution that has
established the 21st century as the century of the gravediggers of despotism
and capitalist plundering. Their agents in this revenge are the Muslim
Brotherhood and its failed representative Mohamed Morsi.
The series of conciliations, including the release of old
regime figureheads from prison, stretches throughout the disaster of the
Brotherhood administration. On the one hand, they have implemented the terms of
the hostile Saudi-Qatari axis, which has played a prominent role in supporting
the counterrevolution in Egypt by increasing debts. On the other hand, they
need the assistance of the old regime's big men to cope with the crisis.
These policies have led the Egyptian economy to enter the
most violent of its crises in decades. The budget deficit has reached 14
percent of gross domestic product, and the overall debt burden is 80 percent of
the GDP. The Central Bank's foreign exchange reserves have collapsed from $32
billion to $13 billion. And nearly half of this remaining reserve consists of
gold bullion not quickly liquidated.
The collapse of the Egyptian pound continues against the
dollar, having decreased its value by 12 percent in the first half of this
year. All of this has led to the rapid flight of both foreign and local
capital, and the inability of the state to fulfill its national commitments. It
has led to severe shortages in basic commodities, which are imported, of
course, in foreign currencies--among them, vital goods such as various types of
fuel and wheat. This constitutes a serious danger not only to workers, but to
the capitalist class and its state.
These barbarous attacks on the living standards of the poor,
which have begun in earnest, have ignited an unprecedented labor and protest
movement that proposes confiscation of the wealth of the businessmen;
nationalization of the big corporations, both foreign and domestic; the refusal
to pay the interest and principal on foreign loans. These cannot but lead to
the overthrow of not only Morsi and his Brotherhood, but the entirety of the
capitalist state.
It is hard to imagine the degree to which the Egyptian state
and the Brotherhood are isolated from reality. For amid all these crushing
crises, the share of the military in the state budget has risen for the year
2013-14 to reach 31 billion Egyptian pounds--3.4 billion pounds more than the
budget the year before. This is above and beyond American military aid, which
is $1.4 billion, or almost 15 billion Egyptian pounds.
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The Labor Movement
The Labor Movement
Despite a months-long decline in political activity before
the earthquake caused by the Tamarod (Rebellion) campaign and the preparations
for June 30 demonstrations, the labor movement has continued to strike, occupy
and demonstrate at rates that were the highest globally during the period from
March to May, and still remain so. The current activity has given the labor
movement new motivation of the greatest importance and possibility.
The labor movement has faced a number of challenges and paid
a great price in its many battles, which have been of a defensive rather than
offensive character. The first of these challenges was the violent capitalist
attack on the movement, using the sticks of the thugs to break up occupations,
using the weapon of closing the factories to apply pressure on workers on the
one hand, while the depth of the economic crisis provided further pressure.
The second challenge has been the conflicts among the
unions. Despite the unprecedented victory of establishing more than 1,000
independent workers unions, there have been broad disparities in the leadership
and militancy of these unions. A rapid shift toward union bureaucratization,
leaning toward conservatism, slow and gradual work, opposition to
politicization, and the division of the movement into two competing federations
has compounded the challenge.
This all comes in addition to the diligent work of the
Brotherhood to revive the old trade union organization under joint control with
the old regime remnants, in an attempt to besiege or assimilate the independent
unions.
It is this that has given the coming popular political
movement an exceptional opportunity for a qualitative shift in the labor
movement.
All of this dictates our task: the forming of coordinating
committees for labor action along sectoral, industry and geographical lines;
the linking of partial demands and total demands; and the linking of economic
demands with political demands. This is the urgent task for revolutionaries in
the coming period.
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The Institution of the Military
The Institution of the Military
The issue of the institution of the military and its
relationship with the catastrophe of Muslim Brotherhood rule has resurfaced as
the most pressing issue on the Egyptian political scene during the past months.
Among the increasing demands of liberal commentators and
leaders, sometimes implied, other times hidden, is the necessity of military
intervention to get rid of Brotherhood rule. This means nothing other than a
demand for a military coup. There has been a flood of statements and articles
regarding the independence, neutrality and patriotism of the institution of the
military.
This flood has not ceased since the Sinai crisis, with the
kidnapping of soldiers, the miracle of their release without military
intervention, the lack of negotiations with the kidnappers and of course
without their capture. It has continued up through the political theater
surrounding the Ethiopian dam, with discourse on the necessity of a military
solution, and finally through the surprise decision of the first constitutional
court on the necessity of permitting the officers and soldiers of the armed
forces to cast their votes in the elections. This was a decision opposed by
both the Brotherhood and the liberals together, for this threatens not only to
politicize the army, but to divide it.
Despite the assertions of the army leadership that it will
not undertake any coup and its eternal assurances of neutrality and patriotism,
it is still the hope of many liberal forces that the army will intervene to
rescue the country from the nightmare of the Brotherhood, to exchange them for
the ranks of the military. How the liberals love that military, which even
until the past year was crushing the necks of Egyptian people and driving the
counterrevolution. The military is still the impregnable wall standing in the
way of the development of the Egyptian revolution and the achievement of its
goals.
There are a number of facts that we must recall when
regarding this comic scenario. First, the institution of the military is not a
neutral institution, but the steel heart of the Egyptian capitalist state, the
state of Mubarak and his remnants, the state of the big businessmen and behind
them American imperialism. Second, the army is the mirror of society and will
not be divided from this society, for its leadership is a fundamental part of
the Egyptian ruling class in both its secular and Islamic wings.
As for the soldiers and officers in its ranks, they are
farmers, workers and poor people. It is not in the interests of the leadership
and army generals that the Egyptian revolution should be victorious, not only
because that would mean, by necessity, judgments passed on their crimes against
the Egyptian revolution. Also, and more importantly, their interests and power
require them to be part of the counterrevolution. As for the rank and file,
they have a direct interest in the implementation of the goals of the Egyptian
revolution--for social justice, freedom and dignity--whether within the army or
outside it.
Thirdly, the myth of the military protecting the people and
the nation has no basis in truth. The connection of that institution with the
American army, American interests and American weapons is what holds the
allegiance of the leadership of this institution. There is no portion of this
loyalty for the Egyptian people. This also means regionally the protection of
Zionist and American national interests, and not the safety and security of the
Egyptian people.
Additionally, we must remember that the military
participates with the Muslim Brotherhood in ruling Egypt. For this was the
bargain between them--a safe exit, a national security council, a secret budget
without any democratic oversight and the continuation of military control over its
economic empire, which comprises a significant portion of the Egyptian economy.
Up to the present moment, this bargain remains in force.
The crisis for the military leadership is that the Muslim
Brotherhood is not capable of executing its part in this bargain, which is the
liquidation of the Egyptian revolution and the pacification of the populace.
Sharing in this crisis is the American administration and some of the Gulf
states.
The entry of army tanks and armored personnel carriers into
Sinai is not for the goal of preventing terrorism or confronting the Zionist
enemy, but for confronting the people of Sinai. They have revolted just like
other oppressed and downtrodden Egyptians against the historic injustice of
Cairo's rulers and the theft of their most basic rights of citizenship.
The differences that have arisen between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the military are related to the failure of the Brotherhood to
resolve the economic crisis and contain or crush the Egyptian revolution. They
are related to the fear of the military leadership that the revolutionary tide
will arrive among the ranks of its soldiers and officers.
This is what will finally happen if the Egyptian revolution
is capable of perservering against the counterrevolution, which is composed of
an alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, the military and the old
regime remnants. The figureheads of the old regime have mostly been released
from prison, honored and glorified, despite the fact that their hands are
stained with the blood of our martyrs.
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The Front for the Salvation of the Muslim Brotherhood
The Front for the Salvation of the Muslim Brotherhood
Since the liberal opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood
formed the National Salvation Front, the weakness of this opposition has
quickly become apparent. It has assisted, first of all, in transforming the
conflict into an identity issue between secular currents represented by the
Front and Islamic currents represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and their
allies among the Salafis. This has, of course, strengthened the position of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Then the liberals gave another gift to the Brotherhood by
allying themselves with remnants of the Mubarak regime, and with their
unceasing demands for military intervention.
This is all in addition to the exceptional fragmentation and
opportunism among the Front's leadership, some of which have gone to meet
Brotherhood leaders, while others criticized, only to then meet with the same
Brotherhood leaders in secret. This is simply the most recent of the farces in
which the Egyptian bourgeois opposition and its hangers-on among the
nationalists and leftists have specialized.
This vacillation of the liberals and the old regime remnants
in opposing the Brotherhood comes from the fact that they, like the Muslim
Brotherhood, don't want a deepening or continuation of the revolution. They
only want a battle around division of power, not around the nature of power.
They are ready, especially by means of the media, to mobilize the populace to
oppose the Brotherhood, but they fear that this mobilization will lead to a new
revolution which will overthrow both them and the Brotherhood at the same time.
For this reason, they will continue to use the masses as leverage in
negotiations with the Brotherhood or to motivate the army to intervene. But
their fear of losing control to the broader movement remains their most
important obsession.
Above and beyond this, they do not put forward any
alternative economic scenario to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is the same
capitalism, the same market policies, the same strategies of begging from the
West and the Gulf and serving in their interests.
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Tamarod (Rebellion), June 30 and the Revolutionary Alternative
Tamarod (Rebellion), June 30 and the Revolutionary Alternative
The Tamarod (Rebellion) campaign has emerged after a period
of retreat in the revolutionary movement to ignite the fuse of that movement on
a national level heretofore unseen. The genius of the name and the simplicity
of the campaign quickly transformed it into a national movement in which
millions have participated with their signatures.
Even more importantly, hundreds of thousands have
participated in the process of gathering signatures. For a large percentage of
these, it was their first time participating in the revolutionary process,
which has increased the breadth and depth of the radicalization among the
Egyptian masses. This is reflected in the tremendous preparations for the
marches of June 30 and the establishment of coordinating committees in every
governorate to prepare for that pivotal day. These comprise the beginning of a
new battle among the battles of the Egyptian revolution.
As has been the case in all previous crises and
revolutionary battles, the situation is complicated. All of the forces hostile
to the Brotherhood participate in the Rebellion campaign and will participate
in June 30. But these forces have different goals for this movement.
There are the remnants of the old regime, which have
regained a large part of their confidence and cohesiveness as a result of the
ludicrous release of the majority of their figureheads from jail with handfuls
of dollars. They are more confident also because the liberal bourgeois
opposition has given them new cover--to appear as if they were a legitimate
branch of the secular democratic opposition against Brotherhood rule. Their
goal within the movement is the complete return of the old regime, even if that
means a new set of figureheads, and the complete victory of the
counterrevolution as well as bloody retribution against the revolution and all
who participated in it.
There is also the liberal bourgeois opposition as
represented in the non-feloul parties of the Salvation Front, who naturally do
not want the completion of the revolution, especially in relation to the goal
of social justice. They only want to limit the influence of the Brotherhood and
the Salafis and to share with them in ruling the country and in formulating its
future. As for the popular movement, according to them it is only a way to
apply pressure to negotiate and conclude bargains in the end.
As for the revolutionaries, the goal of their participation
in the Rebellion campaign and in the battles that will begin on June 30 is to
reclaim the revolution from the Islamists thieves.
This is not because they are Islamists, but because they
have betrayed the revolution, rescued Mubarak's state and implemented the same
oppressive capitalist policies, including complete subservience to American
imperial interests and the big businessmen from the Mubarak period at the
expense of the interests of the revolutionary Egyptian people and the blood of
the martyrs. They have preserved the influence of the police and army generals
and the state apparatus with the same degree of corruption and cronyism that
they have always exemplified. Their goal remains limited: to dominate the
apparatus and institutions of the state, with their leaders participating in
holding power with the remnants of the previous regime at the pinnacles of
these institutions and apparatuses, while their corrupt and repressive
character is preserved.
Salvation from Brotherhood rule isn't, according to the
revolutionaries, a goal in and of itself, but the removal of an obstacle on the
way to completing the Egyptian revolution. It will not be completed without
retribution for the martyrs and the injured of the Egyptian revolution via
revolutionary courts passing judgment on the army and police officers,
Mubarak's businessmen and their thugs, and via the destruction of the
repressive, exploitative and predatory state which still stands.
Mohamed Morsi and his group still protect it to this day
alongside their predecessors. The revolution will not be completed until the
repressive state is replaced with a democratic nation that directly expresses
the will of the masses of Egyptian workers, farmers and poor, a nation that
achieves the goals of the revolution--freedom, dignity, social justice.
It is apparent, then, that what appears to be unity among
these various parties on the goal of removing Mohamed Morsi conceals deep
differences in goals and interests. It is not in the interests of the
revolutionaries to blur or hide or postpone pointing out these differences, but
rather to discriminate from the first moment between the enemies of the
revolution and those who wish to complete it. This not only means complete
independence within the movement from those opportunists and traitors, but also
working to expose them and their true intentions to the people.
Some people imagine that a position like this will lead to
weakness in the battle against Morsi and the crumbling of the forces against
him. The opposite is true, for any leniency toward the feloul or the bourgeois
opposition strengthens Morsi and does not weaken him. For among a section of
the population, the Muslim Brotherhood is able to depict the battle as if it
were a battle between the Brotherhood and the old regime remnants.
Therefore precision, clarity and independence regarding the
old regime remnants and the traitors is a condition for victory over Morsi and
the Brotherhood. As for opportunism and alliances between the old regime
remnants and the bourgeois opposition, this will lead to nothing other than a
loss of credibility for those who commit this crime and will strengthen the
ability of the Brotherhood to remain in power.
The Rebellion campaign and the demonstrations and
occupations of June 30 could evolve into the beginnings of the second Egyptian
revolution. But it is incumbent upon us to learn from the lessons of the
previous revolutionary waves.
Firstly, we need an independent political platform to gather
all of the revolutionary forces and movements in a form independent from the
old regime and the liberals in the National Salvation Front, as a clear
political alternative to this miserable coalition.
Secondly, the labor movement and the popular movements must
be at the heart of this new political front, for they have a direct interest
not only in overthrowing Morsi, but in completing the revolution to its very
end. This means that an alternative revolutionary front must transcend the
secular-religious rivalry between the Muslim Brotherhood and the National
Salvation Front. It must distinguish itself on the basis of its social
alignment with the workers and the poor and their interests.
Third, retribution against those among the old regime, the
military and the Muslim Brotherhood who have killed our martyrs must remain at
the forefront of our priorities and our demands. For we cannot complete a
revolution in the shadow of the release of the murderers of the
counterrevolution, honored and glorified while the blood of our martyrs still
stains their hands.
Fourth, it is necessary that we put forth a clearly defined
program presented as an alternative at the level of the economy, society,
politics and culture. For without winning the people to a clear convincing
revolutionary alternative, when the question of program is raised by the
Brotherhood and the Salafis on the one hand, and the old regime remnants and
liberals on the other hand, we will not be capable of defeating the
counterrevolution and completing our arduous revolutionary path.
Translation by Jess Martin
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